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Abstract
In the first chapter, we investigate the changing landscape of America’s marijuana legislation.
We first build a theoretical model to determine the impact of these changing laws on
adolescents and take a closer look at the intricacies within the market. Then we provide an
empirical analysis to test our hypotheses and improve upon econometric models used in
previous research. We use data from the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) administered from
2009 to 2017 in the United States. Our identification strategy included a non-linear generalized
difference-in-differences approach and a group-time treatment effect. We find there is a
consistent decrease in usage of marijuana by 1.4% to 1.7% in states with MMLs.
The second chapter includes a literature review and theoretical model of the demand for health
insurance and insurance pooling. This chapter provides a framework for chapters 3 and 4.
The third chapter examines the association between firm size and the premiums paid by single
employees for their employer-based health insurance coverage. We use survey data on single
employees, ages 26-64, in 2017, and a secondary analysis using Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey data. We estimated interval regression models of monthly health insurance premiums
by maximum likelihood to determine differences by firm size and plan type. Employees in
smaller firms (less than 50 people) pay more in premiums and individuals with HMO plans pay
about $20 less than those in PPO plans. The current structure of the U.S. health insurance
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marketplaces an undue burden on single employees in small firms. These findings may help
guide future U.S. policies that promote fairness in the U.S. health insurance marketplace.
The fourth chapter examines the values that single adults with employer-based coverage place
on health insurance plan attributes using a discrete choice experiment (DCE). As part of an
online survey, each respondent completed 28 paired comparisons trading-off four attributes:
source of coverage, plan type, monthly out-of-pocket premium, and quality of coverage. Based
on our results (N=2,207), single employees slightly preferred their employer over the
Marketplace as a source of coverage (0.726 odds ratio; p-value<0.01). Single employees would
be willing to switch to the Marketplace for a $25 reduction in monthly premiums. Preferred
Provider Organization (PPO) plans were overwhelmingly preferred over all other plan types,
especially compared to Fee-for-Service (FFS) plans (4.230 odds ratio; p-value<0.01). The
predicted probability that a health insurance plan from the Marketplace would be chosen
ranged from 42% to 43.7%.

vi

Chapter One: Marijuana Legislation and the Effect on Adolescents
1. Introduction
Legislation, in the United States, is rapidly evolving regarding the purchase and use of
marijuana. How will this change affect the utilization for marijuana in legal and illegal markets?
As of 2019, 33 states and Washington D.C. have passed such Medical Marijuana Laws (MMLs),
with eleven of these states going even further passing laws that legalize the recreational use of
marijuana (National Conference of State Legislatures 2019). There is still a disconnect regarding
State and Federal legislation, marijuana is federally recognized as a Schedule I drug, and
according to the United States Drug Enforcement Agency these drugs have no medical benefits
and are highly addictive (Controlled Substances Act 2016). It is unclear how differences in state
and federal law will influence the market for marijuana. We will focus on changes in state
legislation and the differences within state, and how this affects the recreational and illegal
market for marijuana.
There is a worry that the creation of a legal market for recreational use of marijuana would
cause children to increase their usage of marijuana, either through a change in perception of
marijuana risk or greater availability of the drug. There is cause for concern as there are
negative health consequences for adolescents that use marijuana. There is also debate on
whether marijuana is a gateway drug that could lead to the use of other drugs or high-risk
behaviors (Pacek, Martins, and Crum 2013, Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings 2015, Morral,
1

McCaffrey, and Paddock 2002, Bachhuber et al. 2014). This paper will use a graphical analysis to
determine how a change in legislation will affect child usage of marijuana. We will also examine
how the legal market and illegal market will be linked.
Previous literature on theoretical analyses of illegal markets helped guide this paper, and we
built on these findings for a more complete understanding of the market. We also explore
differences in how each state implements legislation. States differ in many ways regarding
marijuana legislation including but not limited to taxes, fees, geographical restrictions,
dispensary restrictions, and regulations. Through the creation of a theoretical model, we
explore the impact of the legalization of marijuana on the supply and demand of marijuana in
the market, and the effect on price and utilization of marijuana. If low cost suppliers of
marijuana leave the underground market and enter the legal market, how will this affect the
price of illegal marijuana? Creating a legal market for marijuana will change demand of
marijuana by adults, but the influence on the usage of children is undetermined.
We also discuss some of the other issues of legalizing the use of marijuana throughout the
paper. For example, changes in the law could save state and federal governments large
amounts money through decreased enforcement costs. A decline in individuals jailed for
marijuana related offenses would reduce the crowding in the prison system. States could
increase punishments for individuals that are caught selling marijuana to children. Canada has
passed legislation that would make it a criminal offense to give or sell marijuana to any person
under the age of 18 punishable by up to 14 years in prison (Cannabis Act 2018). We also
examine the role price elasticity of demand may play in adolescent usage, how the perception
of marijuana may change, and possible spillover from the recreational market.
2

We maintain as our null hypothesis that, absent state restrictions to the recreational market,
adolescent marijuana usage would decrease as recreational marijuana legislation is introduced.
If this is true and adolescent usage is of paramount importance, then the best course of action
would be for states to legalize recreational use of marijuana with very little restrictions and
increase the enforcement and punishment of those individuals that sell or give marijuana to
children. We provide an empirical analysis to test our hypotheses and improve upon
econometric models used in previous research. We contribute to the field by being the first
paper to provide a theoretical model to specifically analyze the impact of marijuana legislation
on the legal and illegal markets and the role exogenous changes would play. This will allow us
to not only make predictions on the usage of adolescents but analyze the differences within
states as legislation is not uniformly implemented. We also improve on the empirical estimates
of previous literature by using a non-linear generalized diff-in-diff specifications and group-time
treatment effects, which have not been used before. We also utilize a unique data set in order
to provide context of the impact of legislation on the perception of punishment and
accessibility.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Legislation and the Impact on Adolescent Usage
There have been a range of findings concerning changes in marijuana legislation and the impact
on adolescent usage. The consensus in the literature is there is a small impact on adolescent
usage, but the results are not significant. Lynne-Landsman, Livingston, and Wagenaar (2013)
found implementation of MMLs has not significantly affected adolescent marijuana usage, at
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least not in the first few years since the legislative change. This paper focused on Montana,
Rhode Island, Michigan, and Delaware in its difference-in-differences framework. Harper,
Strumpf, and Kaufman (2012) also found little evidence of MMLs impact on adolescent usage of
marijuana when controlling for unmeasured state characteristics, as the estimates were
negative and insignificant. Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2015) found a negative relationship
between childhood usage and the legalization of medical marijuana, but these findings were
also insignificant and small. (Anderson et al. 2019) updated their previous study with updated
data and report negative and significant for MMLs and RMLs. Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman
(2012) and Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2015) used a generalized difference-in-differences
framework to exploit time and geographical variation. One preliminary study of medical
marijuana determined that states that enacted MMLs had higher adolescent marijuana use
than those that didn’t, using a two sample t-test (Wall et al. 2011).
There are not many papers that have looked at the impact of Recreational Marijuana Laws
(RMLs) on adolescent usage. There are still only a few states that have passed this legislation
and very recently. Cerdá et al. (2017) looked at the association of RMLs and adolescent use and
found use among eighth and 10th graders increased in Washington, but there was no
discernable difference in Colorado. As more states continue to change legislation regarding
marijuana it will be important to better understand and quantify the impact on children.
Studies performed in other countries regarding specifically decriminalization of marijuana have
found the impact of adolescent usage appears to be negligible. Australian studies determined
there was no significant difference in the use of marijuana by children, and in the Netherlands
reductions in criminal penalties have limited effects on marijuana use (MacCoun and Reuter
4

1997, 2001, McGeorge and Aitken 1997, Donnelly, Hall, and Christie 1995, Williams 2004).
These countries have significant differences regarding not only culture, but also the
implementation of marijuana legislation.
2.2. Legislation and the Impact on Adult Usage
The consensus is that legalizing marijuana for medical or recreational use will increase
marijuana usage by adults, but more could be done to determine the difference in usage rates
in those states that have passed legislation for medical purposes versus those that have passed
legislation for recreational purposes. We surmised that after the passage of MMLs and RMLs
that there would be an increase in adult marijuana usage because of increased availability,
decriminalization, and change in social acceptance. Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings (2015)
found that among adults aged 21 or older MMLs lead to an increase in marijuana use and binge
drinking. Another study focusing on legalization of recreational marijuana determined that
usage among college student in Colorado where much higher than the national average (Jones,
Nicole Jones, and Peil 2018). This study is limited by the fact that data was only collected from
October 2013 to March 2015. Han et al. (2017) also found increases in adult usage from 2006 to
2013, especially in those individuals aged 50 and above. Johnston, O’Malley, and Bachman
(1981) assessed how decriminalization affected high school seniors and young adults, and
found no effect on not only marijuana use, but also attitudes towards marijuana.
2.3. Punishment and Taxation
Pacula et al. (2010) examined how user sanctions affect marijuana markets and the price of
marijuana. The focus of the paper is the evaluation of changes in demand side policies on the
5

equilibrium price of marijuana in illegal markets. They theorized that as the legal risks for users
decrease the prices users face increase, and drug dealers receive a higher profit. DeSimone and
Farrelly (2003) found that increases in the probability of arrest decrease the probability of using
marijuana. Other studies have concentrated on the positive and normative effects of
punishments on the production and consumption of illegal drugs (Becker, Murphy, and
Grossman 2004). This study asserted that placing a monetary tax and making the good legal
would, in theory, cause a greater increase in price and decrease in output than an optimal level
of enforcement. This argument speaks to the question whether it would be more effective to
legalize and tax these substances than to prohibit their use through punishment. Chu (2014)
found that states that pass MMLs increase marijuana arrests by about 15-20% among adult
males and admission to substance-abuse treatment facilities by about 10-20%.
2.4. Price Elasticity and Demand of Illegal Drugs
A few studies estimate the price elasticity of demand for illegal drugs, but finding dependable
data on prices for illegal drugs can be difficult. Van Ours (1995) paper used data from the opium
market in the Dutch East Indies during 1923 to 1938 and found the short-term price elasticity
for opium use is about -0.7. More recent studies have also found inelastic demand for heroin
and methamphetamines (Olmstead et al. 2015, Cunningham and Finlay 2016). A paper that
examined the demand for marijuana among UCLA students in 1972 estimated the price
elasticity of marijuana ranged from -0.7 to -1.0 (Nisbet and Vakil 1972). A meta-analysis
performed by Gallet (2014) determined the price elasticity for marijuana to be less than that of
cocaine and heroin.
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Ding (2003) found that children are more price sensitive regarding cigarettes than adults. An
Australian study also determined that younger age groups are more sensitive to price in
relation to marijuana participation (Williams 2004). It is also possible to affect price elasticity
and demand through public service announcements. Becker and Murphy (1993) argued that
advertising has greater impact on the level of demand rather than the elasticity of demand.
Past literature regarding cigarettes found that public service announcements decreased
demand, but a longer term study performed by Sloan, Smith, and Taylor (2002) determined
that this is less important than previously believed.
2.5. Perception of Marijuana
There is an argument that once marijuana is legalized, children might perceive the risk of using
marijuana has diminished or because marijuana is used for medical purposes it is actually
beneficial for one’s health (Joffe and Yancy 2004). There are conflicting studies on this issue.
Miron and Zwiebel (1991) examined the effect of prohibition and determined that public
perception might cause people to drink more alcohol as the illegal good is now romanticized.
The impact of public perception is unclear and could increase or decrease usage. Khatapoush
and Hallfors (2004) found that while attitudes changed with the passage of MMLs, usage did
not increase. Whereas, Johnston et al. (2018) and Bachman, Johnson, and O'malley (1998)
concluded that perceived risk of harmfulness is an important factor and found an inverse
relationship between daily use of marijuana and its perceived risk.

7

2.6. Spillover Effect
A major concern as marijuana legislation changes in the United States is the access children will
have to marijuana. As more adults begin to use marijuana for medical and recreational
purposes, will it be easier for adolescents to obtain marijuana. Two studies that examined
adolescents in substance treatment programs found it was very common for these individuals
to obtain medical marijuana from someone else (Salomonsen-Sautel et al. 2012, Thurstone,
Lieberman, and Schmiege 2011). These studies were limited to a specific sub-group of
individuals and a small sample size, but it does show that these individuals can very easily
obtain medical marijuana from others. Hao and Cowan (2017) studied states that shared
borders with states that passed RMLs and found that there is a dramatic impact on adult
marijuana possession arrests, but there is no impact on juvenile marijuana possession arrest.
3. Theoretical Model
We start with an analysis of an unregulated market. In figure 1 we have total demand for the
market, DTotal, which is made up of the sum of demand for adults, DA, and the demand for
adolescents, DC. We assume adolescents are more price sensitive (higher elasticity) and
therefore have a flatter demand curve relative to adults. We arrived at this conclusion by a
review of previous literature. The market supply curve, S, is upward sloping. The interaction
between S and DTotal leads to an equilibrium quantity, Q*, and equilibrium price, P*. Adult
quantity demanded of marijuana is QA and adolescent quantity demanded of marijuana is QC. In
the next section we will move to a more realistic version of the market for marijuana.
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In figure 2 we provide a graphical analysis of the regulated market. We still have the same
demand and supply curves used in figure 1. These demand and supply curves do not
incorporate the cost of avoiding detection by suppliers and consumers, A, or the cost of
government enforcement, E, on the decision to buy and sell marijuana. Instead we introduce A
and E as a function that is added to the price paid by the consumer, P* + pd (Ad, E) + Ad, and
subtracted from the price received by the supplier, P* - ps (As, E) - As, we can now see the
“wedge” that is formed in this illegal market as a vertical line between DTotal and S. Consumers
now pay a higher price, PD, and suppliers receive less, PS. The incident of the burden will
depend on the elasticities of the supply and demand curves. The equilibrium quantity decreases
from Q* to QI, as such quantity demanded by adults and adolescents decreases to QA’ and QC’
respectively.
In the next step, figure 3, we will analyze the effect of marijuana legislation on this market. We
will assume that demand will not change for either children or adults after legislation. This is
clearly reasonable for the child market where they will still be functioning in a regulated
market. Which is the focus of this paper. In figure 3, both the illegal and legal market for
marijuana are represented. Once legislation passes for the recreational use of marijuana the
demand that remains would only include those individuals that could not legally purchase
marijuana (mostly adolescents). Those suppliers able to produce marijuana at a lower marginal
cost would leave the illegal market and sell in the legal market where they would not face the
cost to avoid detection and the probability of arrest. First, we examine the legal market. The
equilibrium quantity traded between adults and legal suppliers would be QL which is greater
than QA’. As low-cost suppliers are leaving the illegal market the supply curve for the legal
9

market will shift to the left becoming, S’. The magnitude of the number of suppliers leaving this
market will depend on legal market. We will first examine the situation in which there are no
restrictions in the legal marijuana market.
Next we analyze the illegal market for marijuana. We show the initial illegal equilibrium from
the interaction of DC and S’, before incorporating the costs of avoidance and enforcement, at PI
and QI. Once these costs are added the “wedge” is formed, the vertical line between DC and S’.
The price that adolescents face is now equal to PI + pd (Ad, E) + Ad and the price suppliers face is
equal to PI - ps (As, E) - As. We demonstrate that adolescent quantity has decreased, QC’’ < QC’
and adolescent price has slightly increased, PD’ > PD.
The “wedge” can shift to the left or the right depending on A and E. States can enact policies to
increase expenditures on enforcement against individuals that sell or give marijuana to
adolescents. It would be possible to eliminate the illegal adolescent market for marijuana by
shifting the “wedge” to the left until quantity demanded by adolescents is zero. In the next two
sections we will investigate how exogenous changes will impact the legal and illegal market for
marijuana.
In figure 4, the “wedge” now incorporates all exogenous changes, X and Y, which would restrict
quantity in an otherwise perfectly competitive market such as licensing fees, taxes, location
restrictions, patient restrictions, and limits on the number of suppliers. This will be added to the
price adults pay, PL + pd (Ad, E, X) + Ad, and subtracted from the price suppliers receive, PL - ps
(As, E, Y) - As. In the legal market avoidance and enforcement expenditures will be equal to zero.
Most of these restrictions would impact the suppliers of marijuana, Y. We show that because of
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these restrictions, quantity has decrease by QL minus QY which some might argue is a good
thing, but we must fully understand the possible ramifications in the illegal market. Those
suppliers now unable to sell their product in the legal market may decide to remain in the illegal
market and continue to sell to children. This would directly affect the corresponding shift of the
supply curve in the adolescent market, which would be smaller than before. This would lead to
a higher quantity of marijuana consumed in the adolescent market.
Each state has their own set of laws on governing the creation of this market for recreation
marijuana. States that don’t heavily tax or restrict the sale of legalized marijuana would see a
larger number of suppliers leaving the illegal market and entering the legal market.
By legalizing the recreational use of marijuana, there would be massive amounts of resources
freed up. In figure 1, this amount would be equal to QA’ multiplied by E. Several possibilities for
these freed-up resources include increased level of enforcement in the adolescent illegal
market, rehabilitation services for addiction, infrastructure projects, public schools, and public
service announcements.
In figure 5, we show an enlarged version of the illegal market equilibrium to provide a clearer
picture of exogenous changes in the illegal market, X and Y. This will be added to the price
adolescents pay, PI + pd (Ad, E, X) + Ad, and subtracted from the price suppliers receive, PI - ps
(As, E, Y) - As. We will focus on the exogenous changes that affect adolescents, X. This includes
the potential for children to have greater access to marijuana since the quantity demanded of
marijuana by adults could possibly increase. If parents aren’t conscientious about their own
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personal use of marijuana, and ensuring that it is safely stored, it could lead to more children
being exposed or a spillover effect.
There also may be a change in attitude towards marijuana once legalized. Children may feel
that the drug is safer because it is now legal and is being used for medical purposes. One way to
address this possible change in perception is through public service announcements. This is a
tactic currently being used to inform individuals of the dangers associated with smoking
cigarettes.
These exogenous changes shift the “wedge” to the right. Which could possible obscure the
previous effect seen in figure 3 which shows that legalizing marijuana decreases adolescent
consumption to QC’’, but now we see consumption is greater at QC’’’. Which is one of the
possible reasons why pervious research has had difficulty in finding significant results in this
area.
4. Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1. Data
To explore the impact of marijuana laws on marijuana usage by adolescents, we use pooled
cross-sectional data from the Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) administered from 2009 to
2017 in the United States. The YRBS has collected information on more than 3.8 million high
school students in more than 1,700 separate surveys since 1991 (CDC). The surveys were
administered every two years and are representative of 9th through 12th grade students in the
United States. The purpose of the survey is to monitor health risk behaviors that contribute to
different problems among adolescents and adults in the United States. We focus on individual
12

adolescent data on marijuana use. The variables of interest will be states that have passed
marijuana legislation.
To determine which states have passed legislation, we used information from official legislative
websites of each US state, Politico, and NORML. Indicators will be whether a state has enacted
legislation addressing the following: laws that allow for the medicinal use of marijuana (MML);
legalization of marijuana for adults over 21; decriminalization statutes. One issue is the
differences between state laws dealing with marijuana. States may differ in restrictions for
possession and cultivation limits, medicinal qualification conditions, and penalties. Some states
may allow for the treatment of certain medical conditions, while other states may not. States
that allow for home cultivation and recreational users could led to greater accessibility for
adolescent use and broaden social perception of marijuana use, and we will try to control for
these differences (Pacula et al. 2015).
Certain demographic characteristics could play a role in determining a child’s propensity toward
using illicit drugs. To control for this age, race/ethnicity, and gender will all be included as
variables. Additional state controls will include cigarette tax, beer tax, spirits tax,
unemployment rate, and census population. A dummy variable will be created for a MML
indicator and a legalization (recreational and decriminalization) indicator. The outcome variable
will be adolescent marijuana use. Adolescent use will be evaluated from questions on whether
a child responded yes or no to ever using marijuana and use during the past month.
We also perform sensitivity analyses using National Survey on Drug Use and Health data
(NSDUH) from 2002 to 2017. This is an annual survey of adolescents 12 years and older which
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contains information on marijuana use, but also has more detailed information regarding the
difficulty to obtain marijuana and the penalties associated with using marijuana. We were
unable to obtain state level information for this data set.
5. Analysis
This paper will examine whether states that have implemented legislation regarding
marijuana experience a significant change in adolescent marijuana usage. As states vary in the
implementation of legislation, we will first employ a nonlinear generalized difference-indifferences approach to exploit geographical and time variation (Strezhnev 2017, Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). This allows us to bound the outcome with 0 and 1. This does
lead to stronger assumption, but we will run a linear specification later. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level and robust. The linear specification may be expressed as:
Yist| = β0 + β1Lst + β2Xist + β3Gst + γs + wt + γst + ϵist

(1)

Where Yist represents the decision to use marijuana for individual i in state s by time t; γs and wt
represent state and year fixed effects and we include a state-specific linear time trend, γst. Lst is
a dummy for whether the state s has enacted (not just passed) marijuana legislation at time t.
Xist is a vector of control variables at the individual level, Gst is a vector of state-level controls,
and ϵist is the error term. Individual level controls include age, gender, grade level, and race)
and state level controls include cigarette tax, spirits tax, beer tax, unemployment rate,
population, and median income.
The non-linear specification is expressed as a logit model:
Pr(Yist| β0, Lst, Xist, Gst, γs, wt, γst) = Λ(β0 + β1Lst + β2Xist + β3Gst + γs + wt + γst)

(2)
14

Let xist = (Lst, Xist, Gst, γs, wt, γst), where Λ(β0 + xist βn) equals the logistic cumulative distribution
! !(#$ & '()*+ #)

function and ϵist is assumed to take the logistic form. Also, Λ(β0 + xist βn) = ("# ! !(#$ & '()*+ #) )
As the cross difference in this equation is not equal to the treatment effect, we estimate the
marginal effect or the cross difference of the conditional expectation of the observed outcome
minus the cross difference of the conditional expectation of the potential outcome without
treatment (Puhani 2012). One issue that arises from this approach is we must use a stronger
parallel trends assumption. Following from Strezhnev (2017), the Generalized Parallel Trends
assumes that “the first-differences between all time periods in the potential outcomes under
the control history are mean-independent of assignment to any of the treatment histories”.
This assumption allows us to use those states that haven’t received treatment yet to estimate
the counterfactual for those states that already have received treatment. Another problem is
the estimates are weighted averages of all the possible two group/two period estimates. In
order to address this, we run additional specifications including: linear group-time average
treatment effects and we will look more closely at specific states (Callaway and Sant'Anna
2019).
6. Results
6.1. Respondent Characteristics
There were over 447,810 observations in the sample after removing those that had missing
information for age, sex, grade level, race/ethnicity, and dependent variables. Over half of the
individuals were female (52.2%), fell between the ages of 15 to 17 (75.7%), and a majority were
white (50.9%). Each grade level was represented by at least 20% of the observations. States
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with MMLs comprised 30.1% of the data compared only 3.5% for RMLs which is a small sample
size. Regarding use of marijuana, 19.5% of the respondents answered that they have used
marijuana in the past 30 days, while 35.2% answered that they have used marijuana at some
point in their lives.
When we split the sample based off whether a state has passed some form of marijuana
legislation some characteristics differ slightly. Adolescents in the states that have passed
legislation are slightly younger, and more respondents identify as being Hispanic or an “other
race.”
6.2. Marijuana Usage
In this section we present the estimates from the models described in the analysis. There are
separate estimates for states with MMLs and states that have passed other forms of marijuana
legislation (legalization or decriminalization).
Using the nonlinear generalized diff-in-diff specification we find that legalizing marijuana for
medical use has a negative effect on the usage of marijuana by adolescents. These treatment
effect estimates in Table 3 range from -0.008 to -0.014. The only estimate that was not
significant was the specification that did not control for covariates and the dependent variable
was whether the adolescent had ever used marijuana. This may be because some states have
recently passed marijuana and this variable may not be as sensitive to recent changes like the
question regarding use in the past month. The size of the effect was also consistently bigger for
use in the past month.
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When focusing on other types of legislation (recreational and decriminalization) we find a
consistent positive effect from legislation on adolescent usage of marijuana (0.009 to 0.014). As
we incorporate a state-specific linear time trend we find that the estimates become
insignificant. This differs from our theoretical model and the estimates from states that have
passed MMLs, but there is possible spillover effects and differences in the creation of these
markets that must be accounted for.
Recent literature on generalized difference-in-difference coefficients turn out to be weighted
averages of all the possible two group/two period estimates (Goodman-Bacon 2018). The
weights could be positive or negative and are determined by sample size and treatment
variation. This is an issue that we address by estimating group-time average treatment effects
and performing a synthetic control method on certain states.
6.3. Group-time Average Treatment Effect
In this analysis we address the issue of having multiple time periods and variation in treatment
timing. We follow the approach taken by Callaway and Sant'Anna (2019), and group states
together by year of treatment implementation and calculate average treatment effects using
the “did” package in RStudio. This allows us to focus on the causal parameter of interest. We
are also able to determine if marijuana legislation has a dynamic effect (over time) on
marijuana usage.
We have three groups that introduced MMLs during 2010-2011, 2014-2015, and 2016-2017.
We also only use states that have observations in every year that the survey was given, and we
exclude states that passed MMLs before 2009, causing the number of observations to decrease
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to 173,599. The simple average treatment effect for all groups is decrease of 1.7 percentage
points for ever using marijuana and a decrease of 1.4 percentage points for using marijuana in
the past 30 days each is significant at the 95% level. Figures 6 and 7 show each of these
treatment groups and their estimates with 95% confidence intervals. We also determine how
the effects differ dynamically. When accounting for the effect overtime the estimates are
slightly more negative (-1.9 and -1.5 percentage points) which indicates some small lasting
effect of the MMLs.
When looking at states that have passed legislation other than MMLs we also have three
groups: 2010-2011, 2012-2013, and 2016-2017. We restrict the data as we did in the previous
analysis and have 245,850 observations. The simple average treatment effect for all groups is
1.4 percentage points for ever using marijuana and 1.8 percentage points for using marijuana in
the past 30 days each is significant at the 95% level. The dynamic estimates are smaller (0.6 and
1.5) and insignificant for ever used marijuana. There don’t seem to be any lasting effects from
RMLs or decriminalization.
6.4. Sensitivity Analysis
We used data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) to further explore the
impact of MMLs. This dataset is unique in that is contains survey questions on the difficulty of
obtaining marijuana and the possible penalties associated with getting caught using marijuana.
We use a generalized ordered logit model, but one without the restrictive assumption of
parallel lines or proportional odds. This is done by using gologit2 in Stata 15 and allows for the
βs to differ by the dependent variable’s categories (Williams 2006, Williams 2016). Table 5 and
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6 illustrate the issues that could possibly arise with marijuana legislation if we don’t consider
the dynamics between the legal and illegal markets. We see very consistent significant results,
that in states with MMLs adolescents find it easier to obtain marijuana and reduced penalties
associated with getting caught using marijuana. The positive coefficients of MML states in
column 1 indicate that respondents are more likely to be in higher categories of the dependent
variable (easier to obtain marijuana as category levels increase). The negative coefficients of
MMLs states in column 2 indicate respondents are more likely to be in the current or lower
categories of the dependent variable (harsher penalties as category levels increase).
We also focused our analysis on specific subgroups within the state and tried to find states that
were similar in size and political leanings. The nature of this data set made this difficult as there
are only a few states that have observations in every year. When the analysis was focused on
Arkansas as the treatment group with Kentucky and Oklahoma as controls. We still find
consistently negative impact on marijuana usage, but it is insignificant, and the number of
observations is greatly reduced.
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate an event study to show the impact of MMLs relative to when they
were enacted. There is no significant pre-trend prior to implementation of the MMLs. We do
not find that adolescents are decreasing their usage of marijuana in response to an upcoming
legislation change. Yearly survey data would have allowed for greater accuracy when
completing the event study. We do find an impact on usage up to 4 years after legislation is
introduced. This is in line with our dynamic group-treatment estimates.
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7. Discussion
It is not fully understood how changes in the legislation of marijuana will affect adolescent
usage. We begin by building a theoretical model that allows us to better analyze the impact of
MMLs, RMLs, and decriminalization on the legal and illegal market. We combine this with an
empirical research to test these hypotheses. Our paper utilizes the same YRBS data as
Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2015), but with a new wave of 2017 surveys. This is what is
updated in Anderson et al. (2019), but we also use a second data set (NSDUH) to provide a
comprehensive sensitivity analysis. We also code the legislation by the date of implemented.
We improve upon the empirical strategy by using not only a nonlinear generalized differencein-difference specification which estimates the true treatment effect according to Puhani
(2012), but also a group-time treatment effect specification. We explore the impact of
legislation changes over time and find there is a consistent decrease in usage of marijuana in
states with MMLs.
When focused on adolescent usage in the past 30 days we find consistent significant decreases
in the probability of usage regardless of model specification. We also found a significant
dynamic impact from the change in legislation on adolescent usage over time. We combine
states that have implemented decriminalization and RMLs and find an increase in the
probability usage of marijuana by adolescents. This is largely driven by decriminalization as the
number of observations for states that have passed RMLs is small. Our sensitivity analysis sheds
light on the possible issues in researching this market. Adolescents reported that maximum
penalties for marijuana possession in states that have passed MMLs is lower than states that
haven’t. Adolescents also found it easier to obtain marijuana which contradicts our theoretical
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model and would lead us to believe there would be more marijuana usage. This might allude to
the fact that as adult usage increases there is greater access within the home rather than
through an illegal supplier.
These findings illustrate that making marijuana legal to purchase, for medical purposes, it
would reduce the amount of marijuana usage by adolescents. This could provide a better way
of trying to prevent children from consuming marijuana until they are over the age of 21.
In our literature review we mention studies by (Anderson, Hansen, and Rees 2015, LynneLandsman, Livingston, and Wagenaar 2013) also find similar results, but many studies vary and
there is no current consensus within the literature (Harper, Strumpf, and Kaufman 2012). This
paper also shows consistent and significant negative estimates on not only use within the past
30 days but if an adolescent has ever use marijuana. We find differ from Anderson et al. (2019)
in our findings regarding RMLs. Our model finds an increase in adolescent usage when RMLs are
introduced. They may be due to including states that have enacted legislation to decriminalize
marijuana usage.
Another possible explanation could be that it isn’t the supply of illegal marijuana that is being
affected, but it is that perception is changing towards marijuana. Decriminalization appears to
increase both adolescent and adult usage of marijuana. States implementing marijuana
legislation might want to consider accompanying these changes with laws that included more
severe punishments for suppliers of adolescents.
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7.1. Limitations
One problem that arises in this analysis is the assumption of conditional parallel trends before
treatment does not hold in certain groups, and we can see this in figures 6 and 7. There is also
not enough data currently available to run a robust model on just states that have passed
legislation regarding recreational use. As time passes and more information is collected, we will
be able to focus on these states. It can be hard to disentangle the impact of specific legislation
changes as many states introduce multiple legislation changes over time. Also, MMLs vary in
scope and implementation depending on the state.
7.2. Future Research
Future research will include an extension to this paper using synthetic control approach to
better match states according to pre-trends and further building upon improved statistical
modeling in this area. We will also take an in depth look at the differences within states that
have passed MMLs, this may include whether or not a state allows dispensaries, the fees
associated with opening a dispensary, the number of marijuana plants allowed to be cultivated
within the home, and medical marijuana patients.
8. Conclusion
We show in detail how the markets for marijuana are inextricably linked to one another with
our theoretical model and the role the government still must play even when states move to
legalization. We also, establish significant findings that MMLs reduce the amount of marijuana
adolescents are using. Previous research has issues with model specification that we have
attempted to solve.
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By delaying the age at which children start using marijuana we can shield them from most of
the harmful health impacts associated with the drug. The introduction of a legal market for the
trading of marijuana combined with new laws targeted at illegal production and public service
announcements could significantly reduce the number of adolescents that are getting access to
the drug and education them on the dangers of its use.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Overall
N= 447,810 %

Legislation = 1
N= 228,437 %

Legislation = 0
N= 219,373 %

Age
14 or younger
15
16
17
18 or older

56984
116790
119476
102593
51967

12.7%
26.1%
26.7%
22.9%
11.6%

31926
59809
60344
51620
24738

14.0%
26.2%
26.4%
22.6%
10.8%

25058
56981
59132
50973
27229

11.4%
26.0%
27.0%
23.2%
12.4%

Female
Male

233702
214108

52.2%
47.8%

119571
108866

52.3%
47.7%

114131
105242

52.0%
48.0%

White
Black
Other Races
Hispanic or Latino

227787
70032
51044
98947

50.9%
15.6%
11.4%
22.1%

111161
33403
53240
30633

48.7%
14.6%
23.3%
13.4%

116626
36629
45707
20411

53.2%
16.7%
20.8%
9.3%

9th
10th
11th
12th

125999
120810
111309
89692

28.1%
27.0%
24.9%
20.0%

63354
61414
57037
46632

27.7%
26.9%
25.0%
20.4%

62645
59396
54272
43060

28.6%
27.1%
24.7%
19.6%

2009
2011
2013
2015
2017

123796
88728
81619
79930
73737

27.6%
19.8%
18.2%
17.8%
16.5%

68182
36785
29900
42312
51258

29.8%
16.1%
13.1%
18.5%
22.4%

55614
51943
51719
37618
22479

25.4%
23.7%
23.6%
17.1%
10.2%

Sex

Race/Ethnicity

Grade level

Year
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Table 1 (continued)
Overall

Legislation = 1

Legislation = 0

Medical
No
Yes

281717
166093

62.9%
37.1%

No
Yes

432358
15452

96.5%
3.5%

No
Yes

313032
134778

69.9%
30.1%

No
Yes

360371
87439

80.5%
19.5%

182255
46182

79.8%
20.2%

178116
41257

81.2%
18.8%

No
Yes

290194
157616

64.8%
35.2%

146133
82304

64.0%
36.0%

144061
75312

65.7%
34.3%

Recreational

Decriminalization

Marijuana Use (Past 30 Days)

Marijuana Use (Ever)
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Table 2 Observations by State and Year
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina

2009
1,362
1,161
2,369
1,528
2,772
1,429
2,154
12,144
1,353
2,060
3,927
0
1,963
1,627
933
7,772
3,109
1,711
1,563
1,731
0
1,951
1,424
1,660
33,611
6,946

2011
1,291
1,229
2,613
1,262
2,716
1,378
2,113
13,764
0
1,625
4,878
1,499
1,760
1,583
1,044
8,387
3,968
1,692
0
3,900
2,583
0
1,336
1,581
0
3,527

2013
1,444
1,126
1,456
1,370
2,596
0
2,463
13,907
0
1,811
4,417
0
1,851
1,530
988
0
4,028
1,503
0
4,644
1,698
1,988
1,573
1,611
0
3,061

2015
1,419
1,287
2,352
2,474
4,042
0
2,490
11,103
0
1,680
2,929
0
0
2,343
0
8,593
4,506
1,877
0
4,199
1,567
1,359
0
0
0
5,523

2017
0
1,231
0
1,428
3,885
1,298
2,708
10,274
0
1,758
6,031
1,539
2,244
1,866
1,035
8,544
1,537
0
0
4,464
1,349
1,510
0
0
0
2,893

Total
5,516
6,034
8,790
8,062
16,011
4,105
11,928
61,192
1,353
8,934
22,182
3,038
7,818
8,949
4,000
33,296
17,148
6,783
1,563
18,938
7,197
6,808
4,333
4,852
33,611
21,950
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Table 2 (continued)
State
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

2009
1,721
1,369
1,993
2,994
1,018
2,077
2,139
904
1,505
0
1,642
1,525
3,965
2,684

2011
0
1,123
0
3,681
1,333
1,464
2,528
1,062
1,611
1,359
0
2,061
4,497
2,280

2013
0
1,449
0
2,269
1,487
1,231
1,747
0
2,069
6,344
1,582
1,728
3,821
2,827

2015
0
1,541
2,677
3,155
1,246
1,207
0
2,471
0
4,182
0
1,495
0
2,213

2017

Total
0
1,519
3,434
2,021
1,206
0
1,903
3,014
1,723
0
0
1,384
1,939
0

1,721
7,001
8,104
14,120
6,290
5,979
8,317
7,451
6,908
11,885
3,224
8,193
14,222
10,004
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Table 3 Non-linear Generalized Diff-in-Diff

Medical
Treatment effect

Observations
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Covariates Individuals
Covariates State
State specific linear time trend

Legislation
Treatment effect

Ever Used Marijuana
-0.034
-0.050**
-0.084***
(0.025)
(0.023)
(0.034)
-0.008
-0.011**
-0.018**
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.007)
447,810
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

447,810
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

447,810
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Ever Used Marijuana
0.052***
0.060***
0.053
(0.020)
(0.021)
(0.053)
0.012***
0.013***
0.012
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.012)

Observations
447,810
447,810
State Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Covariates Individuals
No
Yes
Covariates State
No
Yes
State specific linear time trend
No
No
Notes: *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01

447,810
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Use in Past 30 Days
-0.061*** -0.073*** -0.094***
(0.021)
(0.023)
(0.025)
-0.009*** -0.011*** -0.014***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.004)
447,810
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

447,810
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

447,810
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Use in Past 30 Days
0.060*
0.062*
0.087**
(0.033)
(0.034)
(0.042)
0.009*
0.010*
0.014**
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.007)
447,810
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

447,810
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

447,810
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Table 4 Group Treatment Diff-in-Diff
Ever Used Marijuana Use in Past 30
Days
Medical
-0.017***
-0.014***
(0.006)
(0.005)
Dynamic effect
-0.019**
-0.015**
(0.008)
(0.007)
Legislation

0.014**
0.018***
(0.006)
(0.006)
Dynamic effect
0.005
0.014***
(0.008)
(0.005)
Notes: *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01
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Figure 6 MMLs Group treatment Ever Used Marijuana
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Figure 7 MMLs Group treatment Use in Past 30 days
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Figure 8 Decriminalization and RMLs Group treatment Ever Used Marijuana
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Figure 9 Decriminalization and RMLs Group treatment Use in Past 30 days
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Table 5 Sensitivity Analysis Difficulty Obtaining
Difficulty obtaining marijuana

Coefficient

Standard error

95% Confidence Interval

1
MML state
Age
Sex
Race/ethnicity
Constant

0.254***
0.985***
0.114***
-0.033***
-0.921***

(0.025)
(0.016)
(0.024)
(0.005)
(0.051)

0.206
0.953
0.067
-0.042
-1.020

0.302
1.017
0.162
-0.024
-0.821

MML state
Age
Sex
Race/ethnicity
Constant

0.290***
1.069***
0.164***
-0.017***
-1.954***

(0.022)
(0.014)
(0.022)
(0.004)
(0.047)

0.246
1.041
0.121
-0.026
-2.046

0.333
1.097
0.207
-0.009
-1.862

MML state
Age
Sex
Race/ethnicity
Constant

0.260***
1.127***
0.205***
-0.012***
-2.888***

(0.022)
(0.014)
(0.021)
(0.004)
(0.048)

0.217
1.099
0.163
-0.021
-2.982

0.302
1.155
0.247
-0.004
-2.793

MML state
Age
Sex
Race/ethnicity
Constant

0.205***
1.074***
0.149***
-0.002
-4.013***

(0.026)
(0.018)
(0.025)
(0.005)
(0.063)

0.155
1.039
0.100
-0.011
-4.136

0.256
1.108
0.199
0.008
-3.890

2

3

4

Notes: 1 = Probably impossible, 2 = Very difficult, 3 = Fairly difficult, 4 = Fairly easy, 5 = Very easy; *p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***pvalue<0.01
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Table 6 Sensitivity Analysis Maximum Penalty
Maximum penalty

Coefficient

Standard error

95% Confidence Interval

0
MML state
Age
Sex
Race/ethnicity
Constant

-0.510***
0.181***
-0.025
-0.033***
2.792***

(0.037)
(0.023)
(0.036)
(0.007)
(0.077)

-0.583
0.136
-0.096
-0.047
2.641

-0.437
0.226
0.046
-0.020
2.944

MML state
Age
Sex
Race/ethnicity
Constant

-0.390***
-0.212***
0.023
0.001
1.644***

(0.020)
(0.013)
(0.020)
(0.004)
(0.044)

-0.430
-0.237
-0.016
-0.007
1.558

-0.351
-0.187
0.061
0.009
1.730

MML state
Age
Sex
Race/ethnicity
Constant

-0.222***
-0.306***
-0.074***
-0.014***
0.953***

(0.018)
(0.011)
(0.017)
(0.003)
(0.038)

-0.257
-0.328
-0.109
-0.021
0.879

-0.188
-0.284
-0.040
-0.007
1.027

MML state
Age
Sex
Race/ethnicity
Constant

-0.275***
-0.317***
-0.132***
-0.024***
0.651***

(0.018)
(0.011)
(0.018)
(0.004)
(0.038)

-0.310
-0.339
-0.167
-0.031
0.577

-0.240
-0.294
-0.097
-0.017
0.726

1

2

3

4
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Table 6 (continued)
Maximum penalty
Coefficient
Standard error
95% Confidence Interval
MML state
-0.315***
(0.030)
-0.373
-0.256
Age
-0.476***
(0.018)
-0.512
-0.439
Sex
-0.150***
(0.029)
-0.207
-0.092
Race/ethnicity
-0.009
(0.006)
-0.020
0.003
Constant
-0.895***
(0.059)
-1.011
-0.779
Notes: 0= No penalty, 1 = A fine, 2 = Probation, 3 = Community service, 4 = Possible prison sentence, 5 = Mandatory prison sentence;
*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.0
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Event Study
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Figure 10 Event study ever used marijuana
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Event Study
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Figure 11 Event study marijuana use in the past 30 days

49

Chapter Two: Background and Theoretical Model of Health Insurance Demand and Pooling
1. Introduction
What is the best method of providing quality medical care in the U.S.? This has been fiercely
debated over the decades with cost containment and expansion of coverage being at the heart
of the issue. The current system of using employer sponsored health insurance has
inefficiencies that need to be addressed. While the introduction of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) was seen to help individuals that don’t currently have access to
health insurance. It has struggled to meet past enrollment projections and premiums are rising
because of this. Many Americans believe that the collapse of the Marketplace is inevitable. By
focusing on consumer preferences and addressing current market inefficiencies, the
Marketplace may thrive and help individuals attain higher quality health insurance coverage.
We first studied the role that firm size and health insurance plan type have on the cost of
insurance. We found that individuals working in smaller firms pay higher out-of-pocket monthly
premiums than those at larger firms. We attribute this to the pooling opportunities,
administration costs, and negotiating power of larger firms. We next studied the preference of
individuals regarding health insurance attributes: source, out-of-pocket monthly premium, plan
type, and quality of coverage. We found that while people prefer employers as their source of
coverage, the preference isn’t very strong. Individuals also strongly prefer PPO plans over all
over health insurance plan types.
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By nudging individuals from small firms to choose coverage from the Marketplace we could
provide higher quality coverage at a lower cost and stabilize premiums by drawing from a
healthier group of individuals. This would not only solve the problems that arise when small
firms offer health insurance, but the outlook of the Marketplace. We will build theoretical
models on the demand for health insurance and insurance pooling that will guide the analysis in
chapters three and four.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Health Insurance Premiums and Insurance Selection
Emerging research is providing evidence on the impact of the ACA on insurance premiums and
the impact of earlier state-level health insurance reforms. Heim et al. (2015) studied the effects
of the ACA on self-employed individuals and found that premiums are higher on average among
the entire cohort, but, after taking taxes and subsidies into consideration, premiums are 42.3
percent lower for Silver category plans. Studies done on different state-level insurance reforms
have reported contradictory results. Liu and Jin (2015) explore the impact of employer
premium contribution schemes on premiums and find that two market incentives contribute to
premium growth. The impact that market concentration has on premiums has also been an
area of focus. Trish and Herring (2015) look at the relationship between insurer market power
and hospital market power and how this affects employer-sponsored health insurance
premiums. They find that there are offsetting effects of increases in insurer concentration, but
higher levels of concentration are associated with higher premiums.
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There have been many studies using administrative data focused on the selection of health
insurance by consumers. Studies show that consumers do not always make the optimal
decision when choosing their health plan. A study using University of Michigan employment
records shows that one-third of workers were enrolled in a plan that was inferior for them
compared to another plan that they could have chosen (Sinaiko and Hirth 2011). Heiss et al.
(2013) also found that consumers pay about $300 per year in excess spending as a result of
suboptimal health insurance choices. The trade-off between price and wait time has also been
explored. Pizer and Prentice (2011) found that a 10% increase in VA wait times increased the
demand for Medigap coverage by 5%.
2.2. Health Insurance Preferences
Other studies have used survey data to determine what information is most important to
individuals. In Massachusetts, data from state employees show that information on specific
health insurance plan benefits, quality, average out-of-pocket costs, and premium prices are
the most important factors when determining which health plan to pick, while information
about quality of mental health care and the amount of individuals satisfied with their plan are
not considered useful (Tumlinson et al. 1997). This study also found that among respondents
that have switched plans in the past three years, other than the plan being canceled, the top
two reasons were high premiums and high out-of-pocket costs. A study in the Netherlands
found that 64% of Dutch consumers switched health insurers because of the price of insurance
(Duijmelinck, Mosca, and van de Ven 2015). Many consumers also rely on information from
their employers when deciding on a health insurance plan (Feldman, Christianson, and Schultz
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2000). Studies have also shown that employers are responsive to employee preferences when
choosing what health plans to offer as fringe benefits (Bundorf 2002).
2.3. DCE: Health Insurance
There has been considerable research in the emerging area of DCE regarding health insurance
plans and preferences of consumers, especially in Europe. Not as many studies have been done
in the U.S., concerning the ACA and the choices of consumers concerning different health
insurance plans.
Discrete choice experiments have been increasingly used in the field of health
economics. The characteristics that are most widely studied are: (i) monthly premiums, (ii)
source of insurance, (iii) choice of physician and network, (iv) benefits offered by provider, and
(v) insurance coverage. A study done in the Netherlands found that choice of provider was most
important for those people over the age of 45, with some kind of chronic condition, and higher
income; while monthly premium was the most important characteristic for the young, healthy,
and lower income individuals (Determann et al. 2016). This is consistent with other studies that
determined younger consumers tend to be more price sensitive, whereas older individuals are
more concerned about the quality of their insurance (Brabers, Reitsma-van Rooigen, and de
Jong 2012). Chakraborty, Ettenson, and Gaeth (1994) found that the most important attributes
were hospitalization coverage, followed by choice of doctor, premium, dental coverage, and
choice of hospital and there were notable differences in subgroups of the population. Kerssens
and Groenewegen (2005) discovered that the most significant characteristic to be dental
benefits, followed by deductible, and choice of hospitals. Other studies have focused on
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different types of individuals and how they respond to different options. Van de Berg et al.
(2008) found that high and low risk individuals are willing to pay more for insurance products
that can be shown to offer better outcomes, this could be an argument for better health plan
performance indicators to reduce adverse selection. Other studies have found that consumers
most value family coverage and health insurance benefits (Trujillo et al. 2012). A U.S. study
using choice-based conjoint analysis demonstrated how providers could design health
insurance options that would be optimal for the consumer (Gates, McDaniel, and Braunsberger
2000).
3. Theoretical Framework
3.1. Demand for Health Insurance
Early theories of health insurance surmised that obtaining health insurance lowers the
price of health care, and therefore moral hazard is induced (Newhouse 1993). Pauly (1968) was
the first to present the case, that any additional health care that is consumed as a result of
simply being insured is a welfare loss, as the value of the care is less than the value of the cost.
While, Friedman and Savage (1948) proposed that individuals purchase insurance because of
uncertainty.
We used the model proposed by Nyman (2003) which rejects both of these models, and
determines the decision to purchase insurance comes down to a pure income transfer from the
healthy to the sick. In other words, there would be a transfer of income from health individuals
to those who become ill and this type of moral hazard would be welfare increasing. This theory
would also reason that providing insurance for the uninsured and implementation of national
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health insurance would be unequivocally good for society (Nyman 2003). Based on this theory,
the ACA has been successful thus far in providing insurance for more Americans and trying to
make the purchase of insurance easier through state exchanges. The following model will draw
on the previous work of Nyman (2003).
A consumer without insurance, that becomes ill, will solve the following problem:
max Us (M,Y)
s.t. Yo= M + Y,
Us is the utility for the consumer when ill, M is health care, Y is income, and Y0 is the initial
endowment.
The first order conditions are (price of M is normalized at 1):
UsM/ UsY = -1
Yo - M - Y = 0,
A consumer with insurance, that becomes ill, will solve the following problem:
max Us (M,Y)
s.t. Yo – R = cM + Y,
in this equation, R is the premium, and c is the coinsurance rate. The premium is assumed to
actuarially fair, and equals:
R = π(1-c)Hi,
The first order conditions are:
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UsM/ UsY = -c
Yo - R - cM - Y = 0,
This theoretical model shows that an additional increase in either the probability of getting sick
or the coinsurance rate will reduce the demand for health care because the premium and
coinsurance costs experienced by the insured will increase. Now a deeper look into what
attributes of health insurance are most important to the consumer is needed.
Nyman (2003) breaks down the decision of the consumer to purchase insurance with a
comparison of the expected utility without insurance to the expected utility with fair insurance:
Expected utility without insurance,
EUu = πUs(Mu , Yo – Mu) + (1 – π)Uh(0,Yo)
Expected utility with fair insurance,
EUi = πUs[Mi , Yo – π(1 – c)Mi + (1 – c)Mi – Mi] + (1 – π)Uh[0,Yo – π(1 – c)Mi]
Insurance will be voluntarily purchased when EUi > EUu.
3.2. Health Insurance Pooling and Administration Costs
Pauly and Herring (1999) investigated the differences between individual, small group, large
group structures. We used their model to explain our findings and explored if individuals
monthly out-of-pocket health insurance premiums vary by firm size.
Pauly and Herring (1999) found that pooling is greater in larger groups, but the difference might
not be as great as originally thought as non-group insurance markets also try to effectively pool
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individuals. Pooling is not complete for large groups and there is still a great deal of premium
variation according to the individual’s risk profile.
High administration costs, determined by group size and number of insurance options, caused
much of the difference in premiums between the three groups (Pauly and Herring 1999). The
process of “underwriting” in which applications are reviewed varies depending on the size of
the group. In non-group insurance everyone is reviewed, and a premium is determined,
whereas in group insurance the underwriter will take into consideration the characteristics of
the group in its entirety. Individuals in the non-group market must pay higher premiums
relative to the benefits they receive because of these higher loading costs (Pauly and Herring
1999).
Another question is, should employment-based health insurance receive a tax subsidy? Pauly
and Herring (1999) found that this tax subsidy leads to problems with excess levels of health
insurance coverage. By abolishing the tax subsidy, smaller employers could offer higher wages
in lieu of insurance coverage. This could lead to an influx of a large and healthy population to
potentially enroll in the Marketplace.
The Marketplace could be more efficient in pooling small and non-group individuals and offer
lower administrative costs. These costs could also be impacted by investigating which health
insurance options are preferred by individuals and limiting the number of options available to
those that are most valued.
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Chapter Three: Health Insurance Premiums of Single Employees at Small Firms: Are They
Getting a Raw Deal?
1. Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), known colloquially as “Obamacare,” was
designed to transform nearly all aspects of the health care industry. Specifically, the ACA
included provisions to expand health care coverage among the uninsured, lower health care
costs, offer greater insurance choice, increase essential benefits coverage in health insurance
plans, enhance quality of care, and protect patients from punitive or discriminatory actions by
insurance companies (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010). Research and
government statistics indicates that several of these provisions have achieved at least partial
success to date in meeting targeted objectives. For example, the ACA has significantly expanded
coverage rates, especially among those with pre-existing conditions and young adults under the
age of 26 (Garrett and Gangopadhyaya 2016, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2017b).
The ACA also led to the implementation of state-specific Health Insurance Marketplaces, also
known as “Marketplace” or “exchange” plans, which were created in order to give consumers
who needed to purchase insurance on the individual (non-group/employer) market the ability
to more easily compare and purchase different health insurance packages. States have
responded in a multitude of different ways to the ACA legislation, most notably with 32 states
and the District of Columbia expanding Medicaid and 18 not expanding it, and with certain
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states refusing to start health insurance marketplaces and leaving the federal government to
establish and operate the Health Insurance Marketplace within them.
Although poorly understood by most consumers, the Marketplace is most relevant for the
minority of consumers who are not covered by an employer-provided or public health
insurance program (Loewenstein et al. 2013, Newport 2013). Prior to the ACA, research had
shown that information asymmetries and confusing terminology inhibited consumers’
comparison shopping of insurance products (Blomqvist and Léger 2005, Mulligan 2017). To
improve access and affordability for these consumers, premium subsidies for lower income
families (<200% of the federal poverty level) and cost-sharing reductions for lower- and middleincome families (<400% of the federal poverty level) were established for exchange purchases.
Finally, the Marketplace was intended to foster competition among insurance companies
through greater transparency and to control rising health insurance premiums.
Contrary to the intended policy objective, large rate increases for health insurance premiums
were experienced in 2017, but premiums have leveled off as of 2019 for consumers shopping
for insurance through the Marketplace (Cox et al. 2016, Fehr et al. 2018). While uncertainty
around federal policies may be a factor, two fundamental economic problems are adverse
selection and market concentration (limited competition or monopoly insurers) (Terhune and
Appleby 2017). First, despite the individual mandate for health insurance, there is data
suggesting that the younger segment of the population (18-34) did not enroll in the state
exchanges as much as projected, resulting in premium increases to offset insurers’ higher costs
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2017). In some states, insurance companies have
withdrawn from certain state Marketplaces or selected geographic areas, reportedly because of
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losses that were suffered as a result of underestimating the premium costs. Initial exchange
enrollment figures projected by CMS and the CBO were around 21-24.8 million people, but only
12.7 million people were enrolled in the state exchanges in 2016 (Cox et al. 2016, The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation 2016). Nonetheless, enormous variation in state experiences persists.
The cost growth in exchange plans is due in part to “pent up” demand for health care among
previously uninsured persons, who have utilized health services at a greater level than
forecasted after obtaining insurance. Since insurance functions through risk pooling, one policy
solution for lowering cost growth is to increase the number of healthy, low cost individuals who
enroll in exchange plans. However, a substantial number of these individuals have shown
through revealed preference that they do not wish to purchase current insurance products at
current prices. In 2016, 45% of uninsured adults reported that they do not purchase coverage
because of the high cost (Cox et al. 2016). To increase exchange enrollment, policymakers need
greater information about the preferences of people who are choosing between different
health insurance plans to enhance the offerings, subsidies, and other regulations that affect
consumers’ out-of-pocket costs. What could drive consumers to start choosing to enroll in the
Marketplace rather than having inferior coverage or being uninsured.
Related to this, 150 million non-elderly receive coverage through employer-sponsored health
insurance programs in 2016 (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2016). While these plans
are relatively popular with employees, growth of health insurance premiums and cost-sharing
has made even this traditional benefit less generous than in the past. Many health policy and
economic studies have shown that employer-provided health insurance is a socially inefficient
way of providing coverage (Chivers, Feng, and Villamil 2017, Fairlie, Kapur, and Gates 2011,
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Fang and Gavazza 2011). This is particularly relevant given current problems with the ACA. If
more people were to choose insurance plans from the Marketplace, or if employers were
incentivized to send their employees to the Marketplace, this could be a viable way to insure
the feasibility of the broader Marketplace. Doing so would increase the pool of healthier
individuals in Marketplace plans, helping to drive down premiums and promote competition
among insurers. This may also give employees greater labor flexibility and provide better
coverage choice. Although single persons with employer-based health insurance coverage was
not the target population for ACA, they may benefit by switching their source of coverage from
their employer to the Marketplace and the Marketplace may also benefit from their
participation.
To address the critical policy question of how more individuals could be induced to enroll in
Marketplace (exchange) health insurance plans, the purpose of this study is to examine the
premiums paid by single employees for their employer-based health insurance coverage and
their association with firm size and respondent characteristics. What are the attributes that
could drive healthier and lower-cost individuals to buy insurance through the Marketplace?
1.1. Health insurance premiums and insurance selection
Emerging research is providing evidence on the impact of the ACA on insurance premiums and
the impact of earlier state-level health insurance reforms. Heim et al. (2015) studied the effects
of the ACA on self-employed individuals and found that premiums are higher on average among
the entire cohort, but, after taking taxes and subsidies into consideration, premiums are 42.3
percent lower for Silver category plans. Studies done on different state-level insurance reforms
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have reported contradictory results. Liu and Jin (2015) explore the impact of employer
premium contribution schemes on premiums and find that two market incentives contribute to
premium growth. The impact that market concentration has on premiums has also been an
area of focus. Trish and Herring (2015) look at the relationship between insurer market power
and hospital market power and how this affects employer-sponsored health insurance
premiums. They find that there are offsetting effects of increases in insurer concentration, but
higher levels of concentration are associated with higher premiums.
There have been many studies using administrative data focused on the selection of health
insurance by consumers. Studies show that consumers do not always make the optimal
decision when choosing their health plan. A study using University of Michigan employment
records shows that one-third of workers were enrolled in a plan that was inferior for them
compared to another plan that they could have chosen (Sinaiko and Hirth 2011). Heiss et al.
(2013) also found that consumers pay about $300 per year in excess spending as a result of
suboptimal health insurance choices. The trade-off between price and wait time has also been
explored. Pizer and Prentice (2011) found that a 10% increase in VA wait times increased the
demand for Medigap coverage by 5%.
Other studies have used survey data to determine what information is most important to
individuals. In Massachusetts, data from state employees show that information on specific
health insurance plan benefits, quality, average out-of-pocket costs, and premium prices are
the most important factors when determining which health plan to pick, while information
about quality of mental health care and the amount of individuals satisfied with their plan are
not considered useful (Tumlinson et al. 1997). This study also found that among respondents
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that have switched plans in the past three years, other than the plan being canceled, the top
two reasons were high premiums and high out-of-pocket costs. A study in the Netherlands
found that 64% of Dutch consumers switched health insurers because of the price of insurance
(Duijmelinck, Mosca, and van de Ven 2015). Many consumers also rely on information from
their employers when deciding on a health insurance plan (Feldman, Christianson, and Schultz
2000). Studies have also shown that employers are responsive to employee preferences when
choosing what health plans to offer as fringe benefits (Bundorf 2002).
2. Methods
2.1. National Survey of Single Adults with Employer-based Insurance Coverage
The data was collected through an online cross-sectional survey targeting single individuals, 26
to 64 years of age, with no dependents and who currently have health insurance coverage
through their employers. This sample was chosen to focus the analysis on insurance plan
choice. Families and dependents add complexity since multiple people are covered under the
plan, requiring a household level decision model. Also, individuals with public health insurance
were excluded because these individuals face little or no monthly premium and have a different
choice set and reservation options available for health insurance. The age range was designed
to avoid dependent coverage under parental plans through age 25 and typical Medicare
enrollment at age 65. There were definitions of important health insurance terms included
throughout the survey in order to aid the respondent.
Fielding was conducted by a market research firm which invited participants to take part in our
online survey. Quota sampling of employed single individuals aged 26-64 with employer-based
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health insurance was based on age brackets (26-34, 35-54, and 55-64), gender (male and
female), and race (Non-Hispanic, White or Caucasian, Non-Hispanic, African American or Black,
Non-Hispanic, Other, and Hispanic) interactions. These frequencies were determined by a
supplemental analysis of Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) questionnaire data from
2001-2014 to unsure a big enough sample size. The analysis done in this paper is infeasible
using the MEPS- Insurance Component supplementary data, because information on individual
monthly health insurance premiums and firm size are not consistently measured across years
and the amount of missing data is substantial. The online survey did not involve any
intervention or interactions with an individual and the information obtained was not recorded
in such a manner that the respondents or any other living person can be identified, directly or
through identifiers (i.e., no identifiable private information (45 CFR 46.102(f)).
2.2. Analysis of Monthly Out-of-pocket Premiums
In this model, self-reported monthly health insurance premium was the dependent variable of
interest, and the independent variables were firm size (eight categories), age by three dummy
groups (26-34, 35 to 54, 55 to 64), female, four race dummies (Non-Hispanic, White or
Caucasian, Non-Hispanic, African American or Black, Non-Hispanic, Other, and Hispanic), three
educational attainment dummies (Less than Bachelor’s, Bachelor’s Degree, and Greater than
Bachelor’s), three income dummies (Less than $50,000, $50,000 to $75,000, and $75,000 or
greater), four region dummies (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), and four health
insurance plan types (FFS, PPO, POS, and HMO). Apart from response frequencies, we assess
the correlation between firm size and income using a chi-squared test.
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The data on premiums were reported using intervals and are right-censored with the upper
bound considered to be infinity, so we estimate interval regressions (linear and exponential) by
maximum likelihood (StataCorp 2013, Wooldridge 2012).
3. Results
The first two columns in Table 7 show that, among the 6,120 individuals who responded to the
survey invitation, 885 (14.46%) dropped out during the screener, 1,865 (30.47%) failed the
screener requirements (e.g., older than 64 years in age, married, no employer-based health
insurance coverage), and 367 (6.00%) were excluded because sampling quotas were filled.
The 2,207 individuals who completed the survey were younger than those who dropped out,
more likely to be male, less likely to be Hispanic, and from the Northeast and Midwest regions.
Also, this online survey was conducted in 2017 and included more respondents with higher
educational attainment and household incomes compared the MEPS household interviews,
which were conducted between 2001 and 2014.
Table 8 provides an overview of respondents’ firm size, health coverage, health, and medical
care utilization. Firm size was not associated with household income (p-value=0.74). The
predominant plan type that individuals report is Preferred Provider Organizations (70.14%). We
also found that over half of the respondents report paying $100 or less per month for their
health insurance (51.75%), and less than 5% answer that they are in fair or poor health. About
half of the respondents reported $250 or less in yearly out-of-pocket health care costs (44.59%)
and two or fewer medical visits (41.32%).
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3.1. Analysis of Monthly Out-of-pocket Premiums
We estimated two linear interval regressions examining the association between monthly outof-pocket premium and firm size (with and without plan type) controlling for respondent
characteristics. Our results show that firm size is negatively related to premiums (p-value<0.01;
Figure 12) and that firms with less than 50 workers pay out-of-pocket about $20 more for
premiums than larger firms, on average (Table 9). The annual difference in premium costs for
employees at smaller firms (less than 50 workers) would equate to about $200 to $400 per
year.
Although single employees in small firms pay more for their employer-based health insurance
coverage than single employees in larger firms, they have similar health care expenditures (pvalue=0.16). Employees at firms with 25 people or less were less likely to have any medical
visits (p-value<0.05) than employees in larger firms.
Looking at the respondent characteristics (Table 9), premiums were not associated with gender,
educational attainment and household income, but increased with age (p-value < 0.01).
Respondents in the 55 to 64 age group pay about $41.62 more than 26 to 34-year-old
respondents. We also found statistically significant regional differences, as respondents in the
South and especially in the West pay less in monthly premiums than those in the Northeast.
Indicator variables for plan type were added to the second linear regression model to explore
the influence of plan type on premiums. Although plan type is associated with premium (pvalue<0.01), HMO plans were the only plans that differed significantly from PPOs (p-value<
0.01). Specifically, respondents with HMO plans payed about $20.04 less than those with PPOs.
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We examined whether the respondent’s industry (8 indicator variables) was related to
premiums but did not find an association (p-value=0.39).
Finally, we performed a sensitivity analyses. We tested whether the results were sensitive to
functional form and re-examined the associations using two different models: an exponential
model and a linear model on log intervals. While model selection is challenging to quantify,
these adjustments did not influence the findings of this study.
4. Discussion
We expected to find that older individuals and sicker individuals would pay more in monthly
premiums. This study gives a more precise value to the differences among these groups. We did
not find any differences among income or gender. Wealthier individuals are paying the same in
monthly health insurance premiums as poorer individuals. The reason for there being no
significant difference between males and females may be due to the specific group that is being
observed (non-married). We also identified that employees in firms with less than 50 workers
are paying significantly more in monthly out-of-pocket premiums than those in larger firms.
There is also a disparity in the amount of annual medical visits undertaken by those at small
firms. Smaller firms do not have the negotiating power or pooling opportunities to be able to
obtain cheaper rates for their employees.
It is socially inefficient, and arguably inequitable, for the quality and cost of health insurance to
vary by the size of a firm that a person works at. At the very least, this variation may inhibit
labor flexibility or induce job lock (Gruber and Madrian 2002). These problems could be
reduced if policy solutions pooled employees from small firms into a much larger group pool—
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such as the Marketplace. One major attempt by ACA to address this issue is the Small Business
Health Options Program (SHOP), which allows businesses with fifty or fewer full-time
employees to purchase health insurance coverage through online marketplaces. SHOP had
lower than anticipated participation and faced multiple issues including: technical problems
with its electronic marketplace, brokers unwilling to buy-in, and small businesses being
unaware of its existence (Blumberg and Rifkin 2014, Government Accountability Office 2014).
By learning more about individuals’ health insurance, it is possible to help guide them in the
process of choosing health insurance plans and try to correct market inefficiencies. The
Marketplace is a potential solution to this problem. Employees at small firms could get access
to more affordable health insurance. This influx of new beneficiaries would also have an impact
on premiums in the Marketplace.
A limitation of this study may be that individuals generally do not know how much their
employers are contributing to their health insurance. It is possible that the individuals that are
facing the highest monthly premiums at these smaller firms might not be in our sample because
they choose not to have health insurance and pay the individual mandate. We could also
explore different populations than the one studied here. Another possible limitation to the
study is that, when comparing the sample of individuals from this study to the MEPS data, there
are differences since MEPS oversampled African Americans and Hispanics. There are also
differences due to how the data was collected (administered via online survey).
There will need to be continued research on the impact of the Marketplace on health insurance
premiums and insurer concentration. Should there be legislation that targets concentration
among hospitals to avoid a disparity in the negotiating power that hospitals have when dealing
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with insurers? Is there a way to get more transparency for the prices that are charged for
different medical services? We could also explore individuals that are uninsured or those with
public insurance, regarding the type of health coverage they are receiving. There are current
disparities in the health insurance market that need to be addressed, and the objective of
future legislation should be to eliminate these inequalities.
5. Conclusions
Health insurance premiums have been increasing progressively over the past decade in the
United States. ACA was thought of as a solution to control health care costs and increase health
insurance availability. It was hoped that the creation of Health Insurance Marketplaces would
foster competition among insurers and reduce premiums. Many individuals obtain insurance
through their employers and opt not to join the Marketplace, however. Getting these healthy
individuals to choose to purchase insurance through the Marketplace could help manage the
cost of insurance. Individuals would also gain the benefit of not having their health insurance
tied to their job. This may lead to greater labor mobility, as individuals do not have to worry
about being uninsured while looking for new employment. We see that larger firms have an
advantage over smaller firms because of pooling opportunities. Larger firms can offer
employees much lower monthly premiums than those with less than 100 employees. Should
the government motivate small businesses to send their employees to the Marketplace, and
would this lead to better health insurance coverage for these individuals? If that happened,
what would their beneficiaries want? With a much greater number of people in the
Marketplace, it would be interesting to analyze the impact on health care coverage and cost. It
may also be beneficial for firms to not have to offer health insurance. Employers could save
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time and effort by allowing individuals to choose their own coverage. The purpose of this study
is to gain a better understanding of the health insurance coverage of the population and ways
that we could possibly change the structure of the insurance model to deliver more affordable
and sustainable health care.
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Table 7 Respondent Demographic and SES Characteristics

Age in years
26 to 34
35 to 54
55 to 64
Sex
Male
Female
Race/Ethnicity
African American or Black
Caucasian or White
Asian
American Indian or Alaska
Native Hawaiian or other
Pacific
Other
Hispanic ethnicity
Hispanic or Latino
Not Hispanic or Latino
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college, no degree
Associate's degree
Bachelor's degree
Graduate or professional
degree
Household income
$14,999 or less
$15,000 to 24,999
$25,000 to 34,999
$35,000 to 44,999
$45,000 to 49,999
$50,000 to 74,999
$75,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $149,999
$150,000 or more
Refused/Don't know
Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West

Dropout
N=272
% (#)

Completed
N=2207
% (#)

34.93% 95
47.44% 129
17.64% 47

41.34% 912
44.91% 991
13.78% 304

38.60% 104 44.95% 992
61.40% 167 55.05% 1214
15.07% 40
73.53% 200
6.99% 19
0.74% 2

11.92% 263
75.80% 1672
8.97% 197
0.63% 13

0.00% 0
3.68% 10

0.14% 3
2.54% 56

18.01% 49
81.99% 222

11.15% 245
88.85% 1961

0.00% 0
4.42% 12
15.07% 40
10.29% 27
40.44% 109

0.14% 3
4.76% 105
11.51% 254
8.25% 182
43.18% 952

29.78% 81

32.17% 709

2.57% 6
1.84% 5
4.78% 13
10.29% 27
10.66% 28
24.63% 66
17.28% 47
13.60% 36
6.62% 18
7.72% 20

0.18% 3
1.99% 43
6.66% 146
10.51% 231
6.07% 133
29.63% 653
18.08% 399
14.09% 310
7.89% 174
4.89% 107

20.59%
18.01%
36.03%
25.37%

23.65%
23.97%
30.09%
22.29%

56
49
97
69

522
529
664
492

p-value
0.010

0.044
0.861

0.077
0.125

0.908

0.028

MEPS- IC
N=3253
%
29.79%
53.80%
16.42%
42.42%
57.58%
23.95%
66.58%
5.16%
0.80%
0.77%
2.25%
16.19%
83.81%
8.27%
27.45%
9.35%
16.57%
26.50%
11.87%
4.00%
14.88%
19.74%
16.75%
6.55%
22.96%
8.24%
5.07%
1.81%
-----17.15%
21.95%
36.52%
24.38%
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Table 8 Respondent Firm and Health Characteristics
N=2207 % (#)
Firm Size
Less than 10
10 to 25
26 to 49
50 to 100
101 to 500
501 to 1,000
1,001 to 5,000
5,000 or more
Health Insurance Plan Type
Fee-for-Service (FFS)
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO)
Point of Service (POS)
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)
Health insurance Premium (monthly)
$1-$25
$26-$50
$51-$75
$76-$100
$101-$125
$126-$175
$176-$250
$251 or more
Don't know
Self-Rated Health
Fair/Poor
Excellent/Very Good
Out-of-pocket Health care costs (past year)
$1-$250
$251-$750
$751-$1,500
$1,501-$2,500
$2,501 or more
Don't know
Number of Medical Visits (past year)*
None
1
2
3
4
5 to 9
10 or more
Notes: *Doctor’s office or clinic

4.94% 109
8.07% 178
6.21% 137
8.16% 180
19.30% 426
7.66% 169
11.87% 262
33.80% 746
4.76% 105
70.14% 1548
8.29% 183
16.81% 371
16.86% 372
12.96% 286
9.38% 207
12.55% 277
9.20% 203
7.25% 160
8.11% 179
10.83% 239
12.87% 284
4.98% 110
95.02% 2097
44.59% 984
22.56% 498
11.78% 260
8.56% 189
7.97% 176
4.53% 100
20.39% 450
20.93% 462
18.99% 419
13.37% 295
10.19% 225
11.33% 250
4.80% 106
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Table 9 Monthly Self-Reported Out-of-Pocket Premiums for Survey Respondents, by Firm Size

Coefficient

95% Confidence
Interval

Coefficient

95% Confidence
Interval

Firm size (number of employees)
135.64
71.21 200.07
135.86
71.58
200.14
Less than 10
141.04
78.58 203.51
141.20
78.89
203.51
10 to 25
132.72
69.87 195.56
133.45
70.74
196.16
26 to 49
115.75
53.36 178.13
116.44
54.18
178.69
50 to 100
111.28
49.57
172.99
111.44
49.89
172.99
101 to 500
116.85
53.86 179.84
117.62
54.79
180.45
501 to 1,000
115.33
52.97 177.69
115.30
53.09
177.50
1,001 to 5,000
115.95
54.29
177.61
115.51
54.01
177.01
5,000 or more
Age in Years
(26-34 to)
35 to 54
+13.65***
+4.61 +22.69 +13.54*** +4.51
+22.56
55 to 64
+41.62*** +28.68 +54.57 +42.33*** +29.42 +55.25
Gender
(Male to)
Female
-6.90
-15.41
+1.60
-7.47*
-15.95
+1.02
Race/Ethnicity
(Non-Hispanic, White/Caucasian to)
Non-Hispanic, African American
or Black
-7.72
-20.88
+5.44
-6.90
-20.02
+6.22
Non-Hispanic, Other
+10.20
-50.79 +71.19
+10.45
-50.35 +71.24
Hispanic, All races
-8.52
-68.01 +50.97
-6.61
-65.89 +52.68
Educational Attainment
(Bachelor’s Degree to)
-3.56
-14.10
+6.97
-4.01
-14.51
+6.48
Less than Bachelor’s
-0.56
-10.04
+8.93
-0.87
-10.33
+8.58
Greater than Bachelor's
Household Income
($50,000 to $75,000 to)
-1.17
-11.76
+9.42
-0.57
-11.13
+9.98
Less than $50,000
+1.95
-7.92
+11.83
+2.48
-7.36
+12.32
$75,000 or greater
Region
(Northeast to)
Midwest
-3.66
-15.46
+8.14
-3.96
-15.72
+7.80
South
-12.12**
-23.41
-0.83 -12.68**
-23.93
-1.42
West
-26.73***
-38.64 -14.81 -24.03***
-35.97 -12.09
Plan type
(PPO to)
FFS
----------+4.47
-14.40 +23.34
POS
----------+6.52
-8.01 +21.05
HMO
-----------20.04***
-31.03
-9.06
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Estimates shown in 2017 US dollars. No reference group for firm
size to obtain premium means.
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Annual Healthcare Expenditure

Annual Out-of-Pocket Premiums†

Annual Medical Visits‡
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Notes: †A significant negative linear trend (p<0.01). ‡A significant positive linear trend (p<0.05).

Figure 12 Annual Out-of-Pocket Premiums, Annual Healthcare Expenditures, and Medical Visits by Firm Size
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Chapter Four: The Value Employees Place on Health Insurance Plans: A Discrete Choice
Experiment
1. Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was introduced in 2010 as a way of
delivering more affordable and better-quality health care. A major component of this health
care legislation was the creation of an online marketplace where individuals could easily
compare and purchase health insurance plans. The viability of the federally-facilitated
Marketplace is currently in question, as initially the projected number of enrollees had fallen
short and premiums were rising faster than expected (Cox et al. 2016, Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services 2017). As of 2019, premiums for average benchmark plans are decreasing
slightly, but there is a wide variation across the United States (Fehr et al. 2018).Much of the
public believes that the collapse of these Marketplaces is inevitable, and the repeal of the
individual mandate has added to this speculation as well as the possibility of ACA being
declared unconstitutional (Kirzinger et al. 2018, Wamsley 2019). Getting healthier people to
purchase their plans through the Marketplace could help reduce premiums and offer a higher
quality of coverage.
To motivate healthier people to enroll in the Marketplace, it is important to understand their
preferences for health insurance. Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) have been used
increasingly in the field of health economics to examine respondents’ preferences on health
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and health-related goods and services (Clark et al. 2014, Drummond et al. 2015). By asking
respondents to tradeoff between plan attributes, analysts can quantify the value of plan
attributes and predict shifts in demand (McFadden 1974, Orme 2006). In this study,
respondents were asked to choose between health insurance plans that differed in source of
coverage, plan type, monthly out-of-pocket premium, and quality of coverage.
This study is the first to focus on the values of single employees and one of the first to examine
health insurance preferences more generally. Not only is this a far less complex population than
individuals with multiple-person plans or individuals with public insurance (Medicaid, Medicare,
TRICARE, etc.), this population is rather healthy and may be motivated to switch from their
employer-based plans to the Marketplace. Although the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) mandates some continuity of employer-based plans postemployment there is still the possibility of reduced job mobility as the employer no longer
contributes to the health insurance plan (Bailey and Chorniy 2016). Individuals with chronic
illnesses may be disproportionately affected by having their health insurance tied to their
employer (Stroupe, Kinney, and Kniesner 2001). A switch to the Marketplace would allow these
employees to change employers without changing their current insurance coverage. Employees
at smaller firms are also not able to take advantage of risk pooling opportunities and
administrative cost savings that are provided by larger firms (Pauly and Herring 1999).
With the evidence from this study, policy makers will have a better understanding of
consumer’s health insurance preferences and be able to use this information to offer higher
quality and sustainable health insurance coverage.
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2. Method
As part of an online survey, each respondent completed 28 paired comparisons (Figure 13),
choosing between plans that varied by their attributes (Table 10). This section breaks down the
methods by attributes and levels, DCE design, survey instrument, sampling and data collection,
and analysis (Bridges et al. 2012, Louviere and Lancsar 2009, Mühlbacher et al. 2016).
2.1. Attributes and levels
The attributes and levels (Table 10) were taken from the Marketplace and the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) as well as supplemented with a review of the
literature.(Brabers, Reitsma-van Rooigen, and de Jong 2012, Chakraborty, Ettenson, and Gaeth
1994, Determann et al. 2016, Gates, McDaniel, and Braunsberger 2000, Kerssens and
Groenewegen 2005, Trujillo et al. 2012, Van de Berg et al. 2008). For example, we considered
monthly premiums greater than $250, but this didn’t seem to be a realistic option for the target
population based on the MEPS data. The quality levels – also known as metal levels – and their
definitions were taken directly from the Marketplace.
Understanding the intricacies of the health insurance attributes can be difficult, so the survey
contained definitions throughout (see Appendix A). Plan type and quality of coverage attributes
required providing more detailed information; therefore, we included tables with lay
explanations of these terms. Apart from instructional tables, these definitions were easily
accessible by hovering the cursor over the term, at which point a text box would appear with
the definition.
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2.2. DCE Design (Pair Selection, Task, Choice Sets)
To further enhance the respondents’ cognition, the 28 paired comparisons were separated into
two series. The first series included four comparisons where each alternative plan was a
variation on respondent’s current health insurance plan type (see Appendix A). In the second
series (24 comparisons), each alternative plan was a new plan, which allowed plan type to vary.
Generally, we applied the same approach to generate the pairs for each series.
We used a fractional factorial design. Given the descriptive system, after removing the
dominant pairs (i.e., where one alternative was unambiguously better at each attribute
compared to its counterpart), there were 756 possible pairs in the first series (2 alternatives
and 3 attributes with levels ranging from 2-7) and 16800 possible pairs in the second series (2
alternatives and 4 attributes with levels ranging from 2-7). It was not possible to use Bayesian
efficiency algorithm to select the subset of pairs, because there was no prior information to
base expectations (Bliemer, Rose, and Hess 2008); therefore, we applied three rules to select
the pairs:
i.

Within each choice set, the difference in the “premium” attribute had to be at least two
or more levels;

ii.

For source, coverage, and premium attributes, the weighted difference in levels needed
to be less than 1.67 where weighted difference = (A_source - B_source)/2 + (A_coverage
- B_coverage)/3 + (A_premium - B_premium)/4); and

iii.

The total absolute difference in levels within the choice set needed to be less than 0.34
for the first series and less than or equal to 0.25 in the second series where total
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absolute difference = abs(A_source - B_source)/2 + abs(A_coverage - B_coverage)/3 +
abs(A_premium - B_premium)/4).
This was done to gain better information on preferences and to strike a balance between
statistical efficiency and response efficiency. The alternatives in the paired comparisons
differed but not by a substantial amount to limit cognitive burden. There was some overlap in
the design which increased response efficiency, but to account for possibly limiting trade off
information we increased the number of paired comparisons in the second series (total
absolute difference in levels is less than the first series). From this subset of 2758 pairs (402 in
the first series and 2356 in the second series), we arbitrarily drop two pairs from the first series
and add 44 pairs to the second series to achieve a design with 400 and 2400 pairs, respectively.
The pairs were also assigned in respondent-specific blocks (to promote response efficiency),
which randomized pair sequence (4 pairs and 24 pairs) and format (i.e., left-right) (Reed
Johnson et al. 2013).
2.3. Survey Instrument/Questionnaire
As part of the screener, the survey instrument began with questions regarding consent and
respondents’ demographic and socioeconomic status (see Appendix A). The screener also
contained questions about employment, firm size, and their current health insurance plans. The
screener questions were designed to verify qualification to participate and for use in the quota
sampling. After the screener, the DCE component began with three paired comparisons as a
warm-up activity followed by the two series of paired comparisons (one of which was a within-
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set dominated pair). Afterwards, respondents were asked about their health and utilization of
health care as well as any comments about the survey.
To obtain initial feedback on the survey instrument, undergraduate and graduate students at
the University of South Florida, Department of Economics, were hired as beta testers. The main
areas of interest were length of time to complete the survey, technical or syntax errors, ease of
use, clarity in the definitions being presented, and general comments. Most testers completed
the survey within 20 minutes and had little difficulty in understanding the health insurance
attributes; however, some layout and text changes to the instructional material were made
based on their comments.
2.4. Sampling and Data Collection
Participants were recruited via email from a nationally representative panel by Dynata which is
a global marketing research firm. Each invitation included a link to the survey instrument (i.e.
not via online banners, ads, or promotions). The sample selection criteria included: (1) 26 to 64
years of age; (2) single as marital status; and (3) was enrolled in an employer-provided private
health insurance plan. Respondents younger than age 26 were excluded due to the potential
for parental coverage and respondents 65 and older were excluded due to potential public
insurance, largely Medicare.
Quota sampling was based off three age brackets (26-34, 35-54, and 55-64), gender (Male and
Female) and race (Non-Hispanic, White/Caucasian or Other; Non-Hispanic African American or
Black; and Hispanic, All races). These quotas were based on an analysis of MEPS and ensured a
minimum amount of demographic diversity at the pair level.
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2.5. Analysis
For each respondent i, utility (U) of a health insurance plan, s, in choice set, j, is composed of an
explainable component, Visj, and an unexplainable random component, ηisj (i.e., !!"# = #!"# +
%!"# ). Under the assumption that ηisj is extreme-value type-I distributed, the probability of
alternative n being chosen from the complete set of alternatives s (s = 1, …,S) in choice set j is:
&!$# =

!
% "#$
!
∑&%'( % "%$

j = 1,…,S

We incorporated the four attributes of the health insurance plan into Visj using a linear
regression of binary variables indicating the attribute levels:
#!"# = (' )*+,!"# + (( &-./!"# + () &,01!"# + (* 2*3!"#
The coefficients of the regression were estimated using the conditional logit command in the
STATA 13 software. Due to multiple responses per respondent, the standard errors for the
coefficients were adjusted to account for clustering at the individual level. We also performed a
sensitivity analysis using a more flexible mixed logit, but we found no substantial differences in
the odds ratios (i.e. 95% confidence intervals overlapped). We then estimated 95% confidence
intervals for predicted probabilities that a respondent would choose the Marketplace given its
attribute levels using percentile bootstrap methods(Lancsar, Louviere, and Flynn 2007).
As implied by the design and power calculation, we hypothesized that employer-based
coverage, Fee-for-Service (FFS) plans because of the freedom in which it allows consumers to
choose providers of care, lower premiums and greater coverage are preferred over their
counterparts. To aid interpretation, the coefficients are shown as odds ratios. Odds ratios that
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are less than 1 represent that the null level is preferred over the attribute level. The null level
for source was health insurance plan through employer, and the null level for plan type was
FFS. For each level of premiums and coverage, the null is the next lower level (e.g., $50
premiums were compared to $25 premiums; $75 premiums were compared to $50). In
statistical terms, we hypothesized that all odds ratios were significantly less than one at a 0.05
significance level.
3. Results
3.1. Respondent Characteristics
Between May and July 2017, 2,479 respondents were successfully recruited and screened;
2,207 (89.02%) finished the entire survey, which took 23 minutes on average; and 272 (10.97%)
respondents dropped out at some point during the survey. Participants that dropped out were
older, more likely female, and more likely to be from the Southern or Western regions of the
U.S compared to those who completed the survey (Table 11).
Over half of the respondents were female (55.05%), and a majority had attained a bachelor’s
degree or higher in education (75.35%). Most of the respondents (95.02%) self-rated their
health as excellent or very good. Only 4.61% of the respondents chose the dominated option
(Bronze, HMO, $250 vs Platinum, FFS, $25) on the warm-up task. Respondents generally made
the same amount of left and right choice, 49.83% to 50.17% respectively, and less than 1% of
individuals made only the right (left) choice for all 28 pairs.
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3.2. Preferences Between Health Insurance Plans
Table 12 reports the odds ratios, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for the health
insurance attribute levels. In the first four comparisons, the plan type was the respondent’s
current health insurance plan type for both alternatives, whereas plan type varied in the second
series of 24 comparisons. Table 12 shows the results by series and combined. All odds ratios
were significant (p-value < 0.01).
As hypothesized, the first series regarding respondent’s current health insurance plan type
showed that lower premiums and greater coverage were preferred. We find very small odds
ratios at the higher end of the premium scale’ $175 to $250 (0.085 and 0.035) and the biggest
difference in coverage comes from the jump between silver or bronze (0.523 and 0.232,
respectively). The results demonstrate a slight preference for employer-based over
Marketplace as the source of coverage (0.726; 95% CI: 0.646-0.815); however, this is the second
largest odds ratio, which implies that a $25 reduction in premiums or an increase in coverage
from Bronze to Silver or from Silver to Gold would nudge the majority of respondents to switch
to the Marketplace, assuming that they could keep their current health insurance plan type.
The second series compared two new plans, often with different plan types. Among the new
plans, FFS plans were not preferred over all other plan types, which uniformly contradicts the
original hypotheses. Instead, respondents strongly preferred all other plan types to FFS plans,
especially PPO plans (4.230; 95% CI: 3.816-4.687). The results also showed that the difference in
value between the HMO and POS plans was insignificant.
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Comparing the first and second series, the largest odds ratio in the second series was between
$25 and $50 premiums (0.804; 95% CI: 0.737-0.877); otherwise, the results are like the first
series: PPO plans are preferred over FFS plans and a $25 reduction in premiums or an increase
in coverage could nudge the majority of respondents to switch to the Marketplace.
We merged the evidence from both series and found that the effect of moving from employer
to Marketplace is similar for current and new plans types (0.798 and 0.752, respectively).
Similarly, respondents had a slight preference between $25 and $50 premiums and between
Platinum and Gold coverage (0.770 and 0.774, respectively). Overall, source, premiums and
coverage at the upper end of the range did not have a substantial effect on preferences (i.e.,
odds ratio greater than 0.7). On the contrary, the choice between plans largely depended on
whether the plan was a FFS, the premium (ranging from $50 to $250) and coverage between
Gold and Bronze (i.e., odds ratio less than 0.7).
Table 13 shows the predicted probabilities of choosing the Marketplace controlling for the
other attributes. The probability of choosing the Marketplace was 42.0% (CI: 39.5-44.9) in the
first series and 43.7% (41.8%-45.8%) in the second series.
4. Discussion
Although the focus of this study is narrow (single employees with employer-based health
insurance coverage), it is one of the first to examine preferences on health insurance plans in
the United States. It found that a $25 subsidy in premiums is enough for many single
employees to seek coverage through the Marketplace. Alternatively, a slight increase in
coverage, say between Bronze and Silver or between Silver and Gold, would be a similarly
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influential. It also predicted that single employees would pick the Marketplace about 43% of
the time when holding other attributes constant. It was not seen as big of a hurdle as previously
thought.
Contrary to our hypotheses, single employees preferred PPO plans over FFS plans. This suggests
that they valued some freedom in provider choice but wanted the structure of a health
insurance network. Overall, they seemed most interested in a PPO plan with Bronze to Gold
coverage for $50 to $125 monthly premiums. PPO plans are the most frequently utilized health
insurance plan type of workers in the U.S., with about 48 percent enrolled (The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation 2017a). Also, of the 11.8 million consumers enrolled in the Marketplace in
2018, 29 percent chose bronze plans, 63 percent chose silver plans, and 7 percent chose gold
plans (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2018).
These findings show that offering a slightly cheaper or greater coverage (for example: Silver
rather than Bronze) would be enough to entice single employees to choose insurance through
the Marketplace. Instead of lowering premiums or increasing coverage, insurance companies
offering insurance through the Marketplace may increase the number of PPO plans and offer a
wider range of similar options to attract single employees.
Further research could explore those individuals with more complex plans (e.g., family plans)
and determine if their preferences align with those of single employees. Exploring an opt-out
option or a dual response (force and unforced choice model) design regarding the DCE choice
task is a possibility, as the penalty for not having insurance has now been repealed. Future
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research will need to be done on different health insurance attributes and subgroups within
this population.
4.1. Limitations
Our study focused on a narrow sample of individuals, which may reduce the generalizability of
our results. Additionally, people with family plans or public health insurance may differ in terms
of the value they place on health insurance plan attributes. Also, most of the sample selfreported as healthy, more educated, and wealthier than the sample of individuals from MEPS.
Second, the presentation of the choice pairs is meant to closely mimic real-world situations that
individuals might face, particularly the definitions. However, the Marketplace online interface
differs from our set up, which could affect the analysis. Respondents only chose between two
different options in our choice tasks, whereas they face several different options in the
Marketplace. The next version of this survey will incorporate an opt-out option as this would
more closely resemble a situation that respondents would be faced with and considering the
repeal of the individual mandate. There is a trade off between efficiency and complexity when
including an opt-out. Also studies have shown that respondents learn when being forced to
answer choice tasks, and researchers would also need to investigate why respondents are
choosing to opt-out (Veldwijk et al. 2014). At the time of the survey completion not having an
opt out or status quo option was deemed to more closely represent the real world. To some,
the range of our out-of-pocket premium cost was unrealistic, limited to just $25 to $250. For
the population being studied and considering previous analyses, we felt that this was a
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reasonable limit to place on the premiums of individuals; however, some may face no
premiums or higher premiums (e.g., premier plans).
Understanding the value employees place on health insurance plan is particularly challenging
due to the complexity of the health insurance market and its reliance on employer-based
coverage. Prior to the survey, some respondents may not have had a clear understanding of the
terminology related to health insurance and possibly relied on their employers or others to
choose for them. To address this, we included many hover definitions and glossary tables
throughout the questionnaire and choice tasks to inform respondents. The end-of-survey
comments revealed that most individuals did not complain about the terminology. A few
respondents indicated that they would have liked to have definitions within each choice pair
description so that they did not need to jump back to the glossary tables to refresh their
memories on definitions and attribute levels. This issue will be addressed in future designs.
Our results are also conditional on the fact that search costs are not included in the model.
There could be large differences in how much time individuals would have to spend choosing
between many different health insurance options through the Marketplace versus two to three
options that their employer selects. Our hope is that this paper could help guide insurance
companies, within the Marketplace, to offer a smaller selection of plans that individuals prefer.
This would help narrow the differences between the two sources of coverage.
5. Conclusion
These findings can help guide employers and insurance companies to further develop options
that best encapsulate health insurance preferences of single employees. They also show how
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legislation may be passed to entice single employees to purchase their health insurance plan
through the Marketplace. By changing a few key attributes, the Marketplace could attract a
healthier population, while enrollees could benefit by obtaining better coverage that isn’t tied
to employment. While individuals do place some value on having their health insurance
provided by their employers, it isn’t particularly strong. Giving them greater information on the
benefits of the Marketplace or offering them modest subsidies could nudge this population into
the Marketplace, which is a step toward improvements in the U.S. health insurance and labor
markets.
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Figure 13 Choice Pair Example
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Table 10 Attributes and Levels for the Choice Task
Attributes

Attribute Descriptions
A service that helps people shop for and
enroll in health insurance. The federal
government operates the Marketplace,
available at HealthCare.gov, for most
states. Some states run their own
Marketplaces.

Level Descriptions
Current plan type from your current
employer
Current plan type from a state
exchange
New plan type from your current
employer
New plan type from a state exchange

Plan Type

An insurance contract that provides
hospital and/or physician coverage to an
individual for an agreed-upon fee for a
defined benefit period, usually a year.

Fee-for-Service (FFS)
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO)
Point of Service (POS)
Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO)

Monthly
Premium

Agreed upon fees paid by beneficiary for
coverage for a defined benefit period.

$25
$50
$75
$100
$125
$175
$250

Plan
Coverage

Details the amount of costs and services
provided by different metal categories.

Platinum
Gold
Silver
Bronze

Plan Source
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Table 11 Respondent Demographic and Socioeconomic Status Characteristics
Dropout
N=272
% (#)

Completed
N=2207
% (#)

p-value
0.010

MEPS*
N=3253
%

Age in years
26 to 34
34.93% 95
41.34% 912
29.79%
35 to 54
47.44% 129
44.91% 991
53.80%
55 to 64
17.64% 47
13.78% 304
16.42%
Sex
0.044
Male
38.60% 104
44.95% 992
42.42%
Female
61.40% 167
55.05% 1214
57.58%
Race
0.861
African American or Black *
15.07% 40
11.92% 263
23.95%
Caucasian or White
73.53% 200
75.80% 1672
66.58%
Asian
6.99% 19
8.97% 197
5.16%
American Indian or Alaska
0.74% 2
0.63% 13
0.80%
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
0.00% 0
0.14% 3
0.77%
Other
3.68% 10
2.54% 56
2.25%
Hispanic ethnicity
0.077
Hispanic or Latino *
18.01% 49
11.15% 245
16.19%
Not Hispanic or Latino
81.99% 222
88.85% 1961
83.81%
Educational Attainment
0.125
Less than high school
0.00% 0
0.14% 3
8.27%
High school graduate
4.42% 12
4.76% 105
27.45%
Some college, no degree
15.07% 40
11.51% 254
9.35%
Associate's degree
10.29% 27
8.25% 182
16.57%
Bachelor's degree
40.44% 109
43.18% 952
26.50%
Graduate or professional degree
29.78% 81
32.17% 709
11.87%
Household income
0.908
$14,999 or less
2.57% 6
0.18% 3
4.00%
$15,000 to 24,999
1.84% 5
1.99% 43
14.88%
$25,000 to 34,999
4.78% 13
6.66% 146
19.74%
$35,000 to 44,999
10.29% 27
10.51% 231
16.75%
$45,000 to 49,999
10.66% 28
6.07% 133
6.55%
$50,000 to 74,999
24.63% 66
29.63% 653
22.96%
$75,000 to $99,999
17.28% 47
18.08% 399
8.24%
$100,000 to $149,999
13.60% 36
14.09% 310
5.07%
$150,000 or more
6.62% 18
7.89% 174
1.81%
Refused/Don't know
7.72% 20
4.89% 107
-----Region
0.028
Northeast
20.59% 56
23.65% 522
17.15%
Midwest
18.01% 49
23.97% 529
21.95%
South
36.03% 97
30.09% 664
36.52%
West
25.37% 69
22.29% 492
24.38%
* Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (unweighted) 2001 to 2014 oversampled African American and
Hispanic respondents.
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Table 12 The Preferences for Health Insurance Plan Attributes

Attributes
Plan Source

Plan Type*

Levels
(Employer to)
Current plan type:
the Marketplace
New plan type: the
Marketplace

(FFS to)
PPO
POS
HMO
Monthly Premium
($25 to)
$50
$75
$100
$125
$175
$250
Plan Coverage
(Platinum to)
Gold
Silver
Bronze

First Series (4 Pairs)
95%
Odds Standard
Confidence
ratio
Error
Interval

0.726

0.043

0.646

Second Series (24 Pairs)
95%
Odds
Standard
Confidence
ratio
Error
Interval

0.815

Both Series (All Pairs)
95%
Odds
Standard
Confidence
ratio
Error
Interval

0.798

0.035

0.732

0.870

0.777

0.034

0.714

0.847

0.752

0.030

0.696

0.813

4.230
3.080
2.949

0.222
0.231
0.319

3.816
2.659
2.385

4.687
3.567
3.647

4.111
2.905
2.698

0.211
0.203
0.268

3.718
2.532
2.220

4.546
3.332
3.278

0.663
0.431
0.292
0.183
0.085
0.035

0.056
0.033
0.029
0.022
0.013
0.006

0.562
0.371
0.240
0.145
0.064
0.025

0.782
0.501
0.355
0.231
0.114
0.049

0.804
0.524
0.364
0.261
0.128
0.057

0.036
0.024
0.021
0.020
0.012
0.007

0.737
0.479
0.325
0.225
0.106
0.045

0.877
0.574
0.409
0.304
0.154
0.071

0.770
0.500
0.345
0.240
0.116
0.050

0.032
0.021
0.018
0.016
0.010
0.005

0.710
0.461
0.311
0.210
0.098
0.041

0.834
0.543
0.383
0.274
0.137
0.062

0.793
0.523
0.232

0.046
0.044
0.029

0.709
0.443
0.182

0.888
0.617
0.297

0.777
0.579
0.288

0.026
0.028
0.022

0.727
0.526
0.248

0.830
0.637
0.335

0.774
0.563
0.273

0.024
0.025
0.019

0.729
0.516
0.238

0.822
0.615
0.312

* The plan types, Fee-for-service (FFS), Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), Point-of-service (POS), and Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), were
described in concordance with the information provided by the Health Insurance Marketplace.
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Table 13 Plan Source Predicted Probabilities

Levels
Current plan type:
the Marketplace
New plan type: the
Marketplace

First Series (4 Pairs)
Predicted
95% Confidence
Probability
Interval*
0.420

0.395

Second Series (24 Pairs)
Predicted
95% Confidence
Probability
Interval*

.449

0.437

0.418

0.458

* Percentile bootstrap methods 1,000 simulations (dropped 25 highest/lowest)
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Appendix A: Discrete Choice Experiment Information
Screenshots of Metal Category and Plan Type Definitions
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Example of First Series (Respondent’s current plan)

106

Screenshots Consent and Respondents’ Demographic and Socioeconomic Status
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